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An Experiment in Fiscal Activism
by KEITH M. CARLSON
THE NATIONAL economic plan for the eighteen
month period ending June 30, 1973 has been presented
to Congress and the public. The Administration’s plan
is presented in the form of three documents — the
Federal Budget, the Economic Report of the Presi-
dent, and the Annual Report of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers.1 Included in these documents is a
proposed Federal budget program designed to he
consistent with targets for total spending (GNP), out-
put, prices, and employment. General recommenda-
tions are also made for the role of monetary actions
by the Federal Reserve System in the overall eco-
nomic plan.
The goals for the U.S. economy in the months ahead
are stated most explicitly by the Council of Economic
Advisers (CEA) in their Annual Report.2 The goals
consist of a reduction in the annual rate of inflation
to less than 3 percent by the end of 1972, and a reduc-
tion of unemployment to near 5 percent of the civilian
labor force by the end of the year. The Administration
believes that to achieve these targets an increase in
total spending for goods and services (GNP) of 10.5
to 11 percent for the year ending fourth quarter 1972
is required. This rapid increase in total spending is to
he facilitated by an increase in Federal expenditures
of about 11 percent, reductions in tax rates attributa-
ble primarily to the Revenue Act of 1971, and “[a]n
abundant supply of money and other liquid assets and
favorable conditions in money markets
1
The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
Ending June 30, 1973 (Covernment Printing Office, 1972),
and Economic Report of the President, together with The
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Adviser.s (Govern-
osent Printing Office, 1972).
21972 CEA Report, Chapter 3.
:q~j4,p. 106.
This article analyzes the Administration’s national
economic plan within the context of the St. Louis
model.4 First, the 1971 economic plan is compared
with the record to obtain some perspective. Then the
1972 economic plan is examined in terms of feasibility
and internal consistency. Since the evaluation is con-
ducted with reference to the St. Louis model, tile
conclusions reflect the particular characteristics of
that model.5
Evaluation of the 1971 Economic Plan
Confronted with unacceptably rapid inflation, high
unemployment and a continuing deterioration of our
balance-of-payments position, the Administration an-
nounced several major policy changes on August 15,
1971.6 Included were suspension of the convertibility
of the dollar into gold and other reserve assets, im-
position of a surcharge on imports, a proposed removal
of the Federal excise tax on automobiles, and intro-
duction of a system of mandatory price-wage controls,
The announcement of these policy changes reflected
obvious dissatisfaction with tile course of the economy
as it appeared at that time. In February the Adminis-
tration had laid out a very ambitions set of economic
goals, and apparently by late summer was convinced
that sufficient progress was not being made toward
4
The focus of this article is on the stabilization aspects of the
Administrations economic program. The program is actually
much broader in scope, involving discussion of resource
allocation, income distribution, and international economic
affairs.
aLeonall C. Andersen and Keith NI. Carlson, “A Monetarist
Model for Economic Stabilization,” this Review (April 1970),
pp. 7-25.
~For an economic review of 1971, see Norman N. Bowsher,
“1971 ~- Year of Recovery and Controls,” this Review (Dc-
ceniber 1971), pp. 2-10.
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their achievement.7 The purpose of the following sec-
tion is to determine the source of the discrepancy be-
tween the Administration’s economic plan and the
actual course of the economy.8
Economic Goals vs. Realizations
The CEA Report of a year ago projected a 9 percent
increase in total spending from 1970 to 1971. The
actual increase was 7.5 percent. This error of 1.5
percent was the largest since the CEA underestimated
GNP in 1966 by 1.7 percent. Although the 1971 error
was relatively large by recent standards, it actually
was small when compared to the last forecast made
for a full expansion year following a recession, that is,
1962 ( cc Table I).
Table I
CM Projectton Accuracy
of Iota Spendsng (GNPI
CEA
Protected A tool
Change Change E ram *
1962 94/ 6,? 27
1963 4,4 54 10
1964 65 66 01
1965 61 75 14
1966 69 86 1.7
1967 64 56 0~8
1968 78 9.0 1.2
1969 70 77 0.7
1970 57 49 08
1971 9.0 74 1.5
Average absolute er or 1 2
EaedonCgu s th R#rt*ir lies Ilowin
he recast ci
Tha runa,t, or i ngd3n xi C odes
at,on 0 poise real io from plan , r t ma4o
MARCH 1972
Table It
Prorected and Actual Changes in Total Spending
(GNP} and Components 1970 to 1971





Personal Consumption $58J $464 $11.9
Business Fred In estrrs ni 34 61 27
Bosin is tnve tories 4 5 07
Rend ntial Con t uction 11.3 1t2 1.1
Fed ra Purcha as 1.7 0~4 2.1
State & total Pu hates 141 132
Net Eports 0.4 29 33
Total Spending IONPI * $88.5 $72 7 $15 8
Bat onp len Ca in 172 R
Conipen infl o add total na ron dust
The 1971 projections for real product, prices, and
unemployment were closely tied with the total spend-
ing projection (see Table III). In early 1971, the CEA
believed that forces had been set in motion to reduce
the inflation rate quickly and significantly so that the
expected rapid advance of total spending could be
manifested in a sharp increase in real product and an
associated decline in unemployment.
Table III
Projected and Actual Changes in
Economic Act’vity 1970 to’ 1971
CEA
Pro ection Actual Error
Total Spending 101W) 9M/ 7.5
Reat Product 46 27 1.9
Prces 42 46 04
Unemployment Rate 04 1 0 06
Table III shows that the CEA projectcd an increase
in real product of 4.6 percent; the actual increase was
2.7 percent. Unemployment was expected to average
above the 1970 level of 4.9 percent, but was projected
to decline from 6 percent early in 1971 to below 5
percent of the labor force by late in the year. Unem-
ployment held steady near 6 percent dursng the year.
And finally, prices were expected to slow to a 4.2 per-
cent rate of advance. Prices rose 4.6 percent from
1970 to 1971, even xvhen the marked slowdown in
prices in the second half of the year (reflecting price-
wage controls) was included,
A comparison of the actual changes in the com-
ponents of GNP for 1971 with the CEA projections
(see Table II) indicates that the primary source of
error was an overestimation of personal consumption
by about $12 billion. The CEA also overestimated the
accumulation of business inventories and net exports.
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, the CEA underesti-
mated the increase in business fixed investment as
well as Federal purchases.
The 1971 CEA Report attracted more attention ansong pro-
fessional eco~omiststhan other reports of recent years. See
the articles on the 1971 Report by NI. J. Bailey, B. Eisner, pp p~ , p s’~ ~
A. 1’. Lerner and J. L. Stein in The American Economic Re- ~ oacy £ 1ans vs. eatLa1zons
view (September 1971 ), pp. 517-37, and 0. Il. Brownlee,
“The Economic Report of the President, 1971,” Journal of As a first step in examining the source of error un-
Money, Credit and Banking (November 1971), pp. 83338. derlying the CEA projections for 1971. policy plans
5
For a discussion of the 1971 economic plan as it was originally are compared with realizations. ‘lable IV gives
presented, see Keith M. Carlson, The 1971 National Eco-
nomic Plan,” this Review (March 1971), pp. 11-19. planned and actual changes in the NIA budget from
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1970 to 1971 on both an actual and a high-employ-
ment (that is, cyclically adjusted) basis.” From the
standpoint of examining fiscal plans after the fact, the
high-employment budget is more relevant than the
NIA budget because it net out the influence of (JNP
Table IV





NIA Race pIe $ 176 $ 72 $ 104
NIA Expenditures 174 169 + 0.5
t-4lA Surplus or Deficit $ 02 $ 97 $ 99
High-Ensployn,ent Receipt $ 156 $ 93 $ 63
high-Employment Expenditures 16 1 14.9 1.2
High-Employment Surplus
or Deficit $ 0.5 $ 5.6 $ 5 1
Note ~drlirnde In
5
or1971 e tuntcdls tin Ba
and p hI bed i th u tel reease ‘ a 1 Budge
led p srdbychi Iiankon}bn 0,1971
forecasting e zor on thc mos ument of buclg t it cc ipts
antI cxp.nditu es. On a high emplo~ mc it b isis the
CLA unclerestimited the sizc of the fiscal stimulus,
theie ss as more fiscal stimulus than plasm ‘ci as the
high-employ m ~ntbudget it gistered a surplus of ‘5.1
“All references to the high—employment budget are estimates
prepared isy this Bank. For details on this Bank’s procedures
for estimating the high—employment budget, see “Technical
Notes on Estimating the High-Employment Budget,” avail-
able on request from the Research Department of this Bank.
billion less than called for by the budget plan of early
1971. The source of this stimulus is traceable to a
combination of factors including a planned increase
in the social security tax base svhich was not im-
plemented, a larger than planned increase in social
security benefits, and policy changes of the Adminis-
tration’s own making as associated with the August 15
policy announcement.
The CEA assumption about monetary actions in
1971 was never made perfectly explicit. Based on
amplifying statements by CEA members to the press
and in testimony before Congress, a 6 percent expan-
sion of money was considered the minimum necessary
to aclueve the CEA goals. The actual increase in
money ivas 6 percent from late 1970 to late 1971,
although this increase for the year consisted of a rapid
10.3 percent rate of increase in the first 7 months,
followed by essentially no growth in the last 5 months.
Analysis Based on St. Louis Model
The fact that the CEA projections of economic ex-
pansion in 1971 still proved overly optimistic, despite
the fact that key policy variables actually showed more
stimulus than planned, suggests that their economic
plan was not internally consistent. To quantify the
sources of error further, some alternative simulations
with the St. Louis model are presented. Two cases are
considered: estimates based on (1) changes in money
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1
)lojtctilt!. .1 Fi~ii iii tidal ‘
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Toble V
Projected Changes in Spending, Output, Prices
amid Unemployment — 1970 to 1971
Peat Uremptoyment
Total Spemmding Prod..cl P’ices Rate
lBit!’ons I
cEA Projection (2. 2/71) $88.5 9 0’ 4.6 4.2 0.4
Actual 72.7 75 2.7 .1 6 1 0
St. Louis Model Projections
changes n money and
Fc’demoi ipemid:ng
cor’siitent w lb CEA
aiiumptioni 68.5 7.0 2.3 4.7 1.1
(honqes in rr.orey arid
Federal spe.’,ding
as actually occtrmed 7.t.8 7.7 2.9 4 7 1.1
5.,’’ I . n:..,
5
.. l .u, L ‘ i . i.i r
. lb.,. ..,h ii! 15’
the CEA, even with their assumptions about the policy
variables. Furthermore, even though the St. Louis
model foresaw less buoyant total spending growth, it
projected a more rapid increase in prices than the
CEA, and thus substantially less expansion in real
output.
The course of the major economic variables in 1971
was captured \vell by the St. Louis model, as indicated
by the “cx post” simulation using actual money and
Federal expenditures. It should be pointed out, how-
ever, that without price-wage controls, the St. Louis
model probably would have underestimated the extent
of inflation. The persistence of unemployment near
6 percent throughout the year was forecast quite
accurately by the St. Louis model.
The CEA erred significantly in their forecast of total
spending, real product, prices and unemployment in
1971. This error cannot be traced to less policy stim-
ulus than planned. These observations suggest that
the CEA economic plan for 1971 overestimated the
expected impact of stimulus from proposed monetary
and fiscal actions.
The actions of the Administration in announcing
policy changes on August 15 indicated possible recog-
nition of this error, but those policy changes also
reflected a belief that conventional monetary and
fiscal actions were not capable of reducing inflation
in an acceptably short period of time. Even though
the CEA recognized (in their 1972 Report) the slow-
down of inflation through second quarter 1971, manda-
tory price-wage controls were introduced to accelerate
The St. Louis model indicates that the
economy moved as expected in 1971.10
The rate of inflation was being reduced,
although slowly, and the growth of real
product was accelerating. Even though
unemployment was not declining in 1971,
the stage was being set for reductions in
the future. The pattern of monetary ex-
pansion, although irregular, provided a
net stimulus to the economy in 1971,
and can be interpreted as having about
the same economic impact as a steady
8 percent growth.11 However, the pat-
tern of rapid monetary growth followed
by essentially no growth has set the
stage for a different set of problems for
economic policy in 1972 than might
otherwise have occurred with a steady
growth rate.
Economic Goals and Policy Plans for 1972
The Administration has set targets of about a
5 percent rate of unemployment and a 2.5 to 3 percent
501t should also he noted that the economy moved in accord-
ance with the “consensus” of economic forecasts in 1971.
“See Keith M. Carlson, “Proiecting With the St. Louis Model:
A Progress Report,” this Review (February 1972), fn. 6,
p. 24.
the decline.
and expenditures as assumed by the CEA in early
1971, and (2) actual changes in money and
expenditures.
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rate of inflation by the end of 1972. These targets
represent a substantially less optimistic view of basic
economic forces than had been held by the Adminis-
tration a year ago. Last year the Administration set
targets of 4.5 percent unemployment and a 3 percent
rate of inflation by mid-1972. To achieve the 1972
targets, the Administration projects an advance in
total spending of 9.4 percent from calendar 1971 to
1972, or slightly greater than the rate of increase
projected for 1971. This section summarizes the
Federal budget program for 1972, considers monetary
policy recommendations in the CEA Report, then
evaluates the Administration’s plan with the aid of the
St. Louis model.12
Federal Budget Program for 1972
The budget plan for calendar 1972 calls for a rela-
tively large fiscal stimulus. As estimated by this Bank,
a deficit in the high-employnient budget of $14.4
billion is implied.1m Relative to 1969-1971, the budget
plan for 1972 is highly expansionary. Considering the
size of the economy (as measured by potential GNP),
the proposed fiscal stimulus for 1972 is about the same
as experienced in 1967.
Expenditures — The budget plan includes a 13 per-
cent increase in Federal expenditures on an NIA basis
from calendar 1971 to 1972. This increase would be
up sharply from the 8.2 percent average rate of
advance from 1969 to 1971, but slightly belo\v the 13.7
percent average rate of increase from 1965 to 1968.
Defense spending is projected to rise 6 percent in
calendar 1972, after declining at a 4.6 percent average
rate from 1969 to 1971. Nondefense spending, on the
other hand, is planned to rise a very rapid 16 percent
in 1972. This increase would follow increases of 16.1
percent in 1971 and 16.7 percent in 1970. From 1965
to 1969, nondefense spending increased at an 11 per-
cent average rate. Projections of nondefense spending
for 1972 include a pay raise for Government em-
ployees on Januany 1, a sharp increase in grants-in-aid
to state and local governments (general revenue shar-
ing) retroactive to January 1, a proposed increase in
‘
2
flates of increase projected for certain economic variables are
not stated explicitly in the 1972 CEA Report. Where such
increases are discussed, they are based on estimates made
by this Bank.
53
The level of the surplus or deficit in the high-employment
budget is subject to considerable vanialion, depending on
the nature of the assumptions underlying its estimate, See
“Technical Notes on Estimating the High-Employment
Budget,” available on request from this Bank.
Receipts — Federal receipts on an NIA basis are
projected to rise by over $16 billion in 1972, or about
8.2 percent. This increase is expected to he large
because incomes and profits are projected to advance
rapidly.
When sources of receipts growth are considered,
the GNP projections assume added importance. Table
VI gives the sources of changes in receipts for 1972.
Tax changes tending to reduce receipts include: (1)
the continuing effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1969;
(2) the effect of the Revenue Act of 1971, affecting
Table VI
Planned Changes in Federa Receipts
1971 to 1972
Not’onal hicom Acco ate Budget
(Billions of Dollarü
Change- ip Total Rec tpts $16.3
CS ege clue to Sowift 214
Chorsga due to to Rate Ad
1
£ rnei’its 5 1
P sonol tax mid Surta Receipts 5 9
Corporate Profile Tax Ac ruets 1.6
me ed Su nes Ta and Wanta Accruals 17
cant ibutians for Social lnsuranee 4 1
social security benefits, effective July 1, and increased
expenditures associated with a proposed reform of
welfare programs.
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personal taxes via increased exemptions
and deductions, corporate taxes through
the job developmcnt tax credit, and ex-
cise taxes because of their removal from
automobiles, and the suspension of the
import surcharge. Changes in tax laws
tending to increase tax receipts include:
(1) expansion of the base for social se-
curity taxes from $7,800 to $9,000; (2)
a proposal for additional expansion of
the base from $9,000 to $10,200; and
(3) a revision toward less liberal depre-
ciation allowances. The combined ef-
fect of these changes in tax laws results
in a decrease of receipts of $5.1 billion.
Consequently, the projected $16.3 billion
increase in receipts implies a $21.4 bil-
lion increase due to rapid economic
expansion.
Surplus/deficit position — The combined effect of
increased expenditures and receipts is an increase in
the deficit to $36 billion in calendar 1972 from $23
billion in 1971. Since the NIA budget is influenced by
the projected pace of economic activity, a better
measure of the expected economic impact of the
budget program is the high-employment budget.
On a high-employment basis (as estimated by this
Bank), the NIA budget is projected to be in deficit
by about $14 billion in 1972. The $14 billion figure
reflects an estimated $20 billion rate of deficit in the
first half and a$ 9billion rate in the second half. This
fiscal stimulus for calendar 1972 is about the same
as in 1967, when measured relative to potential GNP.
However, the planned 1972 fiscal stimulus has substan-
tially different economic implications tItan the stimu-
lus in 1967. The 1967 stimulus occurred when there
was vcry little slack in the economy, and thus con-
tributed importantly to the development of infla-
tionary pressures. The proposed fiscal stimulus for
1972 comes at a time when there is considerable eco-
nomic slack, suggesting that total demand for goods
and sen-ices can be expanded substantially without
reviving inflationary pressures.
tion that the required monetary growth will be
forthcoming.14
Though very general in their recommendations, the
CEA does caution against extretne variations in the
rate of change of the money stock.
‘4 similar precept of steadiness with respect to
monetary policy would also help to avoid inflationary
excesses of demand. The problem is that there is no
single measure or objective combination of measures
of monetary policy that is a completely satisfactory
or completely superior sneasure of monetary policy
by which a princile of steadiness could he cali-
brated. Judgment must be exercised. However, there
is probably a presumption against extreme values or
variatioos of the rate of change of narrowly defined
money, i.e., currency plus demand deposits.15
Evaluation Based on St. Louis Model
The St. Louis model is used to focus on two con-
siderations. (1) Is the projected increase in total
spending consistent with the proposed stabilization
policies?56 (2) Are the price and unemployment goals
consistent with the projected increase in total
spending?
Feasibility of total spending goal — Table VII shows
the results of the St. Louis model for the follo\ving
four combinations of policies:
1) increases of Federal spending as proposed in the
budget and an expansion of mone at a 6 percent
annual rate;
~~1972 CEA Report, p. 26.
°ihid., p. 112. tm6For purposes of evaluation, steady growth rates for money
of 6 and 8 percent are assumed. These alternatives are
illustrative and are in no way directly attributable to the
CEA, or the Federal Reserve System.
Table VII
Pr&ected Changes in Total Spending (GNP) — 1971 to 1973
1971 to 1972 3972 to 1973
(Billion ) Increase (Billions) Increos
CEA Projection (3/24 72) $982 94 $ —
St. Louis Mod I Pro
1
e lion
With 6 percent money
growlh ond Federal
pending based on
fiscal 1973 budget 770 74 71 2 63
2) Wstt, 8 percent money
growth and Federal
pending ha ed on
fi at 1973 budget 84.0 8.0 92 68 2
3) With 6 percent money
growth and Federal
spending growth at a
steady 9.7 percent rote 71 1 68 8L2 7.3
4) With 8 percent money
growth and Federal
spending growth at a
steady 97 percent rate 781 75 1025 91
MonetaryPolicyRecommendations
The CEA again carefully avoids making any spe-
cific recommendations for tnonetary policy in 1972.
Monetary policy plays a definite role in the eco-
nomic plan, however, as the CEA indicates that the
GNP increase of 9.4 percent is based on the assump-
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2) increases of Federal spending as proposed in the
budget and an expansioss of money’ at an 8 per-
cent annual rate;
3) an increase of Federal spending at a steady 9.7
percent annual rate (this is time rate of increase
of expenditures from second half 1971 to first
half 1973) and an expansion iii money at a
6 percent annual rate; and
4) aim increase of Federal spending at a steady 9.7
percemst annual mate amid an expansion of money at
an 8 percent annual rate.
According to the St. Louis model, the proposed
budget policies would not yield an increase in total
spending of 9 percent even if money grew at a rapid
8 percent rate. This conclusion reflects the properties
of the St. Louis model with respect to the impact of
fiscal stimuli. According to the model, an acceleration
of Federal spending has a positive impact on GNP for
only two quarters. with the total effect receding to
zero after 5 quarters. This property is in sharp contrast
with other econometric models. Despite this substan-
tial difference in the treatment of fiscal stimuli, the
error in projecting CNP for the St. Louis model has
averaged between $3 and $4 billion per year since
1965.
The combinations of policies in Table VII indicate
that Federal spending based on the budget and 8 per-
cent money growth would come closest to tile CEA
spending projection, though it would still fall short by
a substantial amount.17 The combinations based on
steady growth of Federal spending yield a lower total
spending projection in 1972 than those based on an
expenditure pattern as given in tile hndget. However,
a steady growth in Federal spending would imply a
stronger growth in CNP in 1973 than if the pattern
evolves as projected in the budget.
implications of total spending goal — As a step
toward examining tile internal consistency’ of the
Administration’s overall economic plan, attention is
focused on the 1)ri(’(~’‘and unemployment projections.
\Vithout regard for how tile total spendmg target is
achieved, Table VIII on the following page shows the
implied paths for rcai product, prices, and unemploy-
ment as gu-en by the St. Louis model in comparison
until the CEA. The St. Louis model result \vith 6 per-
cent money growth is also included for reference.
These compansons are influenced by’ assumptions
regarding the success of price-wage controls. The
Given the proposed budget programn, the St. Louis model
indicates that a1 2percent rate of increase in money be-
ginning first quarter 1972 would be required to achieve the
CEA proiection of a 9.4 percent increase in total spending
in caicudar 1972. It should also be pointed out that CNP
has gi’own as fast or faster than 9.4 percent in only one
year (1966) out of the last twenty.
CEA has indicated considerable confidence in the
controls, and has formed its targets with respect to
prices, real product and unemployment accordingly.1t
The St. Louis model does not incorporate explicitly
any effect for price-wage controls, but focuses instead
on price trends in the absence of controls. St. Louis
model projections of prices, which are not markedly
different than those projected by the CEA, wotiid sug-
gest that the price-wage control program is not going
to be subjected to great strains by the underlying
course of monetary and fiscal actions.
The results for the year 1972 indicate that the St.
Louis price projections are not nlarkedly higher than
tile CEA’s, even given their projected path for total
spending. Wilere the difference may hegiml to appear
significant is in 1.973, though tile CEA does not pro-
vide projections for calendar 1973. In other words, for
1972 the St. Louis projections for prices’ are roughly
consistent \vith those projected by the CEA with a
price-wage control program. Tile rate of inflation
appears to be in time process of being reduced even in
the absence of coiltrols. It should he noted, however,
tilat unless this implication is taken into account, there
is a risk of setting the stage for severe strains on the
price-wage control framework in 1973 if monetary and
fiscal actions hecome unduly expansive.
~~i972 CEA Report, p. 26,
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goals, a large fiscal stimulus
Toble y~ to total spending has been
Protected Changes in Spending, Output, Prices proposed. Affirming a belief
and Unemployment — 1971 to 1973 m the success of prsce-wage
(Eerteat) controls, the large advance in
972 1973 total spending is expected to
I I It IV Year 11 Itt mV Year be translated into faster real
product growth and lower
CM Pr*ctioa (1/24 72) unenlployment.
TotS Spndr ~ 11.0 ihO 107 10 9.4 —
Reel Predoct 5,4 7 77 7 9 s~ — According to the St. Louis
P ices £3 31 2.8 2 4 32 ——— model, the projected increase
tJnemploymetit Rate 5 9 58 55 3 56 in total spending is not con-
St Lou ~Mode Proiectiqns. sistent with the policy actions
With CM totS proposed by the Administra-
peed mig” tion. If for some reason the
totolSpisd(n9 110 110 1 104 94 04 0.2 100 9t 104
Root Product 68 69 6.8 66 59 64 44 44 63 ~ targeted mcrease m total
Prices 40 t 38 32 3 ~& 3 6~ 3 .6 spending is achieved, the St.
thiermip oymont Rate 6.0 5 8 6 £4 57 53 5 1 49 4 a s ~ Louis model indicates that
2) With 6 pe cent ttianey the 1972 goals for unemploy-
end 9oi’e ntnent ment and prices are realistic.
span my bi~S on
1973 ~ However, achievement of
Tote $pendtny 39 84 54 46 74 56 74 80 77 63 these goals in 1972 would
It poduct 7 47 19 13 40 25 46 .6 .54 3. have important implications
Pr~ç a 4.0 aP 36 3 32 30 24 L 20 29 for the course of economic
Umieniploym mi Ret, 60 60 59 4 60 63 65 64 63 £ activity after 1972. In par-
i*Jt excot he sn*emi,toym ut are sum I a elm he an m ymnent ticuiar, substantial employ-
, uesnmmioylmm ea tot timer
E e theism Tenet w mndebmrthmfln b at mentgainsml972maybe
~‘&‘ ~abm Fl axe asS romectson TIes itular 1~tIn ma situ a V an 110* incurred at the cost of re-
twanot to, so ig ~ shni$ smot I on at the EA I n 1 th kindling inflationary pressures
in the future.
Given the CEA total spending goal and roughly The economy is being confronted with a large fiscal
comparable projections of prices, the St. Louis model stimulus. However, it is not so large as to prevent
indicates that unemployment will be reduced in 1972. monetary actions from being controlled in such a way
The rate of decline in unemployment is slightly less as to keep the economy on a sustainable path toward
than projected by the CEA (the differences being eventual attainment of full employment with relative
minor), price stability. With moderate monetary growth, the
economic expansion will continue, although at a rate
Summary slower than projected by the Administration. The
The Admninistration has forecast that the U.S. prospects for reducing inflation and phasing out price-
economy will attain reductions in unemployment and wage controls are good, if monetary expansion is
inflation sisnultaneously in 1972. To achieve these maintained at a moderate rate.
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